Policy-Based Federated Learning by Katevas, Kleomenis et al.
Policy-Based Federated Learning
Kleomenis Katevas
Telefonica Research
kleomenis.katevas@telefonica.com
Eugene Bagdasaryan
Cornell Tech
eugene@cs.cornell.edu
Jason Waterman
Vassar College
jawaterman@vassar.edu
Mohamad Mounir Safadieh
Vassar College
msafadieh@vassar.edu
Eleanor Birrell
Pomona College
eleanor.birrell@pomona.edu
Hamed Haddadi
Imperial College London
h.haddadi@imperial.ac.uk
Deborah Estrin
Cornell Tech
destrin@cs.cornell.edu
ABSTRACT
We are increasingly surrounded by applications, connected devices,
services, and smart environments which require fine-grained access
to various personal data. The inherent complexities of our personal
and professional policies and preferences in interactions with these
analytics services raise important challenges in privacy. Moreover,
due to sensitivity of the data and regulatory and technical barriers, it
is not always feasible to do these policy negotiations in a centralized
manner.
In this paper we present PoliFL1, a decentralized, edge-based
framework for policy-based personal data analytics. PoliFL brings
together a number of existing established components to provide
privacy-preserving analytics within a distributed setting. We evalu-
ate our framework using a popular exemplar of private analytics,
Federated Learning, and demonstrate that for varying model sizes
and use cases, PoliFL is able to perform accurate model training
and inference within very reasonable resource and time budgets.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Increasingly ubiquitous sensing and data collection through our
personal devices and our surrounding environment has created
the potential to offer innovative services and applications, while
also creating significant value from our personal data. The data
collected from our smartphone applications and Internet of Things
(IoT) devices in our homes and workplace, and the resulting infer-
ences such as our behavioral patterns, preferences, activities, and
personal relationships, are often used for a variety of personal and
public Machine Learning (ML) models, such as building targeted
advertising, content recommendation, health analytics, or mass
surveillance.
Today’s ML-based systems tend to follow a common pattern:
data are collected from various data sources (e.g., mobile sensors or
through user interactions), then aggregated and processed centrally,
typically on some kind of cloud-hosted service. While successful,
this approach creates several challenges: trust, as the user requires
1https://github.com/minoskt/PoliFL
guarantees that the provided data will not be misused by the central-
ized service provider; security, as unauthorized disclosure of these
rich data resources [29] leads governments to bolster consumer
privacy protection through regulation (e.g., EU [19], US [48], and
Japan [46]); and scalability, where the costs of building, maintaining,
and managing large data-centers required by current approaches
become prohibitive as the volumes of data are increasing dramat-
ically, e.g., some estimates suggest that sensors from individual
autonomous vehicles could generate terabytes of data daily [38].
More recent approaches suggest the concept of edge computing,
where data is processed as close to the source of data as possible,
e.g., at the 5G base station or on the users’ devices.
While these approaches solve some of the aforementioned prob-
lems, decentralization raises new data-access challenges as users
are still faced with an “all or nothing” data access decision (i.e., ei-
ther unrestricted access to the data source or strict denial of access
which often entails denial of key features). For example, in the
mobile ecosystem, currently led by Android and iOS, each app can
request unrestricted data access to a specific source (e.g., Location)
and the user can either accept or deny this request. Moreover, there
is no accountability the system will use the data as intended. For
instance, a music provider might want to restrict its services by
interpreting location data in a country-level granularity, however
the user must simply trust that the provider will not misuse this
open-access permission for other needs at the future (e.g., selling
the data to other companies interested in personal advertising).
To tackle this challenge, we present PoliFL, a scalable, context-
based approach to personal data processing. Rather than centrally
collecting data from a user population for later processing, PoliFL
moves the required computation to the network edge where data
logically resides with the data subject. This model is a better fit
for current privacy and data processing regulation and allows data
subjects to bear more of the cost of providing storage, computation
and connectivity. In contrast to traditional data permission man-
agement systems where data access is controlled using an “all or
nothing” concept, our privacy management component extends
Ancile [3], a framework for contextual integrity that reframes pri-
vacy as prevention of harmful uses and imposes restrictions on data
usage accordingly.
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Our design addresses the previous issues by deploying theDatabox
platform [13], a user-controlled platform that provides container-
ized and access-controlled personal data storage at the edge. We
further deploy Central Service, a centralized node that coordinates
data access at each user-controlled deployment (i.e. Databox). The
Central Service is responsible for receiving data processing requests
from third-party services. It handles these requests by coordinating
with the edge devices that contain the data. The Central Service
transfers the request along with the associated data policy to the
participating user’s Databox, where data are accessed and processed
locally, in accordance with the data policy. If authorized by the pol-
icy, the processed results (e.g., filtered data, inference outcome or
locally trained model), are sent back the Central Service, which
processes the results from all the users and sends them back to the
interested provider.
We evaluate our system under different combinations of dis-
tributed training: (i) centralized training, (ii) federated learning, and
(iii) differentially private federated learning (Section 4).We show that
using an ML-based task, the model converges even when choosing
different aggregation methods and policies. We further evaluate
the performance of PoliFL in terms of internal (i.e., edge-device)
and external (i.e., system) overhead, by simulating three different
policy execution tasks distributed to 312 users (Section 5).
Our system can be beneficial to various use cases where third
party providers are only interested in specific features from the
user data (e.g., a health-related provider might be interested in the
broad statistics of the trends in the steps a user has made per week),
require data access with less granularity (e.g., a bank might only
be interested in the city that a transaction took place to permit it),
or use a locally trained model of each user (e.g., a movie provider
might integrate users personalized movie recommender models
into its global model using federated learning).2
This paper makes three key contributions:
• We present PoliFL, an open-source privacy-aware personal
data platform that mediates third party services’ access to an
individual’s personal data via verified, audited, and policy-
controlled programs.
• We evaluate the platform for managing secure access of
users’ personal data.
• We extend the Ancile Policy Management framework into a
distributed privacy framework for applications.
2 MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
Recently, there has been an increasing demand in privacy-preserving
content personalization and sensitive data analysis. Examples in-
clude the introduction of Federated Learning by Google [11], re-
quests for sensitive image analysis and model building by Facebook
against revenge porn,3 or on-device behavioral intervention against
bulling for kids by the BBC Own It app.4 In all these cases, sensitive
personal data needs to be used for building personal local models
based on individuals’ policies. In this section we investigate some
potential use cases for our proposed system.
2This work does not raise any ethical issues and an ethics approval from our institution
was not needed.
3https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/nudes-facebook-revenge-porn-naked-
pictures-send-a9207941.html
4https://www.bbc.com/ownit/take-control/own-it-app
2.1 Privacy at the Edge
There has been a large body of research demonstrating how Edge
Computing and local analytics can help in preserving data privacy
while enabling accurate analytics [10, 13, 21]. A number of recent in-
dustry efforts have also adopted this model for performing accurate
analytics while respecting privacy. For example, the Brave browser
delivers personalized adverts based on analytics performed locally
on users’ devices [23, 47]. The BBC has also developed the BBC
Box5 for private and secure aggregation of data and content person-
alization based on the Databox (discussed in Sec. 3). Recently, large
service providers like Google and Apple have adopted techniques
such as Differential Privacy [17] and Federated Learning [10, 30]
to deploy scalable algorithms for on-device analytics within highly
sensitive tasks.
2.2 Privacy Permissions
Typically, mobile and IoT systems have requested that users grant
unrestricted access to data sources, such as mobile sensors, loca-
tion, contacts or calendar. More recently, the concept of app-based
permission was introduced, where each application requested per-
mission to access a data source, either before an app was installed
(Android until v6.0), or at the moment an app feature requires such
access (iOS, Android v.6.0+).
In these access-based systems, consent is typically given at a
very coarse granularity (e.g., all-or-nothing). Once an application
has access to a sensor or data source, the user has little or no control
or visibility into how that data is used. Consequently, some devel-
opers were designing attractive features (e.g., customized weather
forecasts based on current location) in order to persuade users to
grant access to their sensitive data, while at the same time collect-
ing this data for other purposes (e.g., analyzing the data for hedge
funds)6. Recent versions of Android and iOS do have privacy set-
tings that allow a user to set permissions such that applications can
collect data only while in use. However, going forward to support
data-rich applications that respect users’ privacy, we must look to
more robust privacy frameworks, such as contextual integrity and
use-based privacy.
2.3 Contextual Integrity
Contextual integrity [39] looks at privacy through the lens of so-
cial norms of information flows from one party to another. These
information flows are defined along five different parameters: the
data subject, the data sender, the data recipient, the information type,
and the transmission principle. For example, in a machine learning
system, a smartphone user (the data subject and data sender) might
be comfortable with sending samples of their typed text (the in-
formation type) to a service provider (the data recipient) for the
purpose of improving keyboard prediction (the transmission prin-
ciple), but not for any other purpose (such as detecting the user’s
mood). While contextual integrity is a useful tool in analyzing and
discussing privacy, the challenge is how to implement such a pri-
vacy preserving framework in a system that enforces these policies
in real-time.
5https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2019-06-bbc-box-personal-data-privacy
6https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/12/10/business/location-data-privacy-
apps.html
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2.4 Use-Based Privacy
Use-based privacy [7, 8] defines privacy as a prevention of harmful
uses. Data are associated with policies that authorize certain types
of data use while denying other uses. These policies are reactive,
as they can change as data is transformed. For example, a sim-
ple use-based policy around location data is allowing the current
smartphone location to be viewed by a weather application only
at the granularity of a city. The data in question is location, and
the “use” is being able to view the data. This use is only authorized
once the precise GPS location has been transformed to a city-level
granularity.
Policies may also change due to external events. A use-based
location policy might state that a user’s location may only be shared
while the user is driving a company vehicle. The “use”, whether the
location data can be shared, changes based on the event of driving
the company car. As these policies are reactive, a run-time policy
monitor, such as Ancile [3], is needed for enforcement.
2.5 Use Cases
Wepresent the following use case, building a video recommendation
system based on user preferences, which illustrates how PoliFL can
be used as a secure and distributed solution that protects a user’s
privacy when dealing with personal data. Traditionally, it would
require a central cloud-based system that collects the user’s viewing
preferences (e.g., watched movies, rankings, watching time, etc.)
and either trains a new model, or contributes to existing models
for recommending movies to the customers.
In this work, we assume that each user (i.e., customer) has de-
ployed an edge device (e.g., a smartphone, or a Databox [13] that
stores data related to their movie preferences. The provider (i.e., the
movie company) does not have direct access to the collected data;
rather it uses the Central Service to distribute a use-based policy for
execution on the edge device. Under those assumptions, we report
on two different approaches that our system could use to protect the
user’s privacy, while also allowing the provider’s recommendations
to benefit from the user’s viewing preferences:
Data Filtering uses filtering policies to obfuscate/remove sen-
sitive data about user behavior, only allowing the transformed data
to be sent to the provider’s server. The provider can use the filtered
data for training a global model for movie recommendation.
Federated Learning is a novel technique to perform privacy
preserving distributed training [10, 30]. It allows a global provider
to distribute an ML model to different users for training on local
data, and then aggregate the resulting models into a single power-
ful model without observing the users’ private data. We propose a
policy that enforces Federated Learning, allowing locally trained
models to be released to the provider. Each Databox trains a person-
alized model locally and our system enforces the policy requiring
Differential Privacy [1, 36] to be applied to hide private information
from the training set. Finally, a global model is produced in a central
node (i.e. Central Service) and sent back to the provider.
3 PLATFORM OVERVIEW
Figure 1 gives an overview of PoliFL, which consists of multiple
edge devices running the Databox platform and a Central Service
used for device coordination. We assume that a third-party service
is interested in an outcome (i.e., a generalized ML model) from a
collective personal data processing. This service makes a request to
Central Service, which is responsible for maintaining the users’ data
policies and coordinating the communication between the service
and the edge devices, where the data is located. We also assume that
each device contains one instance of the Databox platform per user
and ideally has the form of a physical device (e.g., located at the
user’s house). Each Databox also includes an Ancile deployment,
providing a local use-based policy management system which en-
sures all edge computation is done in a policy compliant manner.
Results computed from the Databox are sent back to the Central
Service, which also contains an instance of Ancile for executing
policies globally on the received data before sending any results to
the third-party service.
3.1 The Databox Platform
The Databox [13] is an open-source platform that enables data sub-
jects to manage controlled access by third parties to their personal
data. It mediates access to and, where necessary, collects data from
local and remote sources, ranging from online social networks to
IoT sensors. It allows data subjects to inspect data gathered from
their data sources, and to effect actuation of IoT devices. It provides
data processors with specific, limited, logged access to subjects’
data by allowing data subjects to select, install, and run applications
published by those data processors.
The platform uses Docker containers [16] as a way to bundle
application code and associated environment (libraries, etc.) in a
portable image format that can be instantiated on a wide range of
host operating systems, including macOS and Windows in addition
to Linux. Docker configuration enforces isolation between running
containers, preventing container access to network connectivity,
ensuring that communication between containers must take place
using the Databox RESTful APIs over HTTPS using SSL/TLS certifi-
cates distributed to each component on launch. This also makes it
straightforward to support hybrid models where some components
run on the device in the home, and some run remotely in the cloud.
The main components of the Databox architecture (presented in
Figure 3) are:
Stores, associated with drivers and apps, that provide the API
through which other components interact with drivers and apps.
They authenticate and authorize access to data, which they may
also retain locally. Request authorization is obtained by the store
successfully verifying a bearer token presented by the other party.
The API supports a range of data types, including time series and
key-value data, accessed via polling or a websocket-based streaming
API.
Drivers represent data sources, and are responsible for all inter-
actions with the data source, IoT device or online service. A driver’s
function is to perform the tasks needed to import data into the
Databox, and to provide an API to actuate IoT devices if applicable.
Data imported by a driver is written to a store. Drivers provide data
in response to reads to their associated store and invoke actuation
of devices in response to writes to their associated store.
Apps represent data processors in Databox, obtaining access to
data at install time and subsequently processing that data. They
may publish processed data through their own store to make it
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Figure 1: Platform overview: A 3rd-party service sends a policy using the Central Service (e.g., an instruction to receive an
ML model trained with multiple users). The policy, together with an initial shared model, is distributed among all registered
devices and is executed using the Ancile use-based privacy framework (e.g., train a model and apply differential privacy). The
data, certified with the attached policy, is then returned to the Central Service and summarized by Ancile using the post-hoc
instruction included in the policy (e.g., average themodel in a federated learning approach). The final result is finally returned
to the interested 3rd-party service.
available to other apps. Apps cannot communicate with anything
other than stores for which they have valid tokens plus the Arbiter
from which they may request new tokens.
For code in a container to access personal data requires relaxing
a “default deny” configuration, done on the basis of user-authorized
permissions represented as bearer tokens granted by the system to
the container in question. Each Databox container comes with a
manifest that outlines the permissions it requires, which is trans-
lated on installation into a service level agreement (SLA) encoding
the granted data access and export permissions, which the platform
then enforces.We address the limitations of such an “all-or-nothing”
permission-based system by incorporating Ancile use-based policy
management system explained below.
3.2 The Ancile Platform
Ancile [3] is a trusted computing environment that allows third-
party services to perform policy compliant data computation. It
executes submitted programs in a trusted environment on behalf
of a service while enforcing use-based privacy policies on data. It
achieves policy enforcement by extending programs to operate on
policy-tagged values known as a Data-Policy Pair.
A Data-Policy Pair contains two restricted fields: _data and
_policy. The _data field contains a stored value whose use is
governed by the policy represented in the _policy field. To prevent
programs from directly manipulating data or policies, submitted
programs are compiled with RestrictedPython [43] before execution.
RestrictedPython limits the application’s program to predefined
Ancile commands and prevents access to internal data structures
by transforming the code before compilation and raising errors if a
program attempts to access any protected data fields (marked with
a leading underscore) or attempts use any unsafe language feature.
In particular, compilation with RestrictedPython guarantees that
Data-Policy Pairs are opaque to the submitted program and their
internal fields can only be inspected or manipulated by Ancile.
Therefore, the only way for a program to interact with a Data-
Policy Pair is through a predefined library of Ancile commands,
Ancilelib. A call to an Ancile command invokes Ancile’s reference
monitor, which checks for policy compliance before the command
is executed. If the existing set of commands is not sufficient, devel-
opers may also add their own commands to Ancilelib, once those
commands have gone through an approval process by the Ancile
Administrator.
Policies are specified as regular expressions over an “alphabet”
of commands. Policies define a state transition diagram, specifying
how data values and any derived values may be used. Ancile com-
mands operate on Data-Policy Pairs, which transform the data and
advance the policy in the Data-Policy Pair. For example, command
fetch_data has to be followed by the filter command before it
can be publicly released, thus the policy will look like:
fetch_data . filter . return
Ancile effectively supports use-based privacy, however, it runs
on a centralized server so all computations must be done centrally.
While this can be a valid solution for enforcing polices at an insti-
tution or enterprise level, it does not scale to more decentralized
authority. Our work extends Ancile to support policy-based private
analytics by running a deployment of Ancile on each edge device
and coordinating via the Central Service.
3.3 Central Service
The Central Service is responsible for maintaining data policies
and coordinating the communication between a third-party service
provider and all interested devices. It runs as a web service and
receives and executes programs on behalf of third-party services.
These services communicate with the Central Service by making
requests for data through the Access Service module. The Central
Service runs an instance of Ancile, which maintains data policies
for all users in the system. Users have data policies for each service
they are interested in using and have a web-based dashboard on
the Central Service to view, add, delete, and modify these policies.
When a third-party service requires users’ data from one or
more edge devices, the service sends a request with the following
elements:
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• Application Token: A secret token that is used to authen-
ticate the service to the Central Service.
• Global Program: This program makes requests to the edge
devices for data. It also aggregates and filters the results
from the edge nodes. The result of this program, if policy
compliant, will return data to either the edge devices or the
service who made the request.
• Local Program: A piece of computation to be executed on
the edge devices and whose result, if policy compliant, will
be returned to the Central Service.
The Central Service handles each request by first validating
the service’s token. Once the service has been validated, Ancile
executes the Global Program. The Global Program then selects the
participants and sends the Data-Policy Pair along with the Local
Program to the selected users on the edge devices.
Once the edge device receives the request from the Central Ser-
vice, it is executed on the Ancile instance of the edge device. The
edge device can then send Data-Policy Pairs back to the Central
Service.
To demonstrate the operation of the Central Service, we assume
that a service wants to perform a typical federated learning task:
(1) An initial sharedmodel trained with data from public sources
is created on the Central Service.
(2) The Central Service picks a subset of all participants and
sends them a copy of the shared model.
(3) Each selected participant personalizes the model with their
own data.
(4) The updated models are sent back to the Central Service,
and combined to create a new shared model.
(5) Steps 2-4 are repeated in as many rounds as needed.
(6) The final model is either distributed to the edge devices for
local use or is returned to the third-party service that made
the request.
In the example above, a Global Program is used to create the
initial model, selecting the participants for each round of training,
sending the model to the participants, and combining the results of
each round to build a newmodel. Since the initial model was created
from public sources, the policy is permissive, with no restrictions
on how the model can be used. The Local Program fetches the user’s
data from the Databox, updates the local model, and returns the
updated model to the Central Service (if authorized by the local
version of Ancile running on the edge device).
In this example, the edge devices would send back an updated
model Data-Policy Pair trained on the local edge device data. These
Data-Policy Pairs from all the participants can be combined on the
Central Service using Ancile’s aggregation functions. Aggregation
functions take in multiple Data-Policy Pairs and return a new trans-
formed Data-Policy Pair with an intersection of the policies from
all the source Data-Policy Pairs. If all the Data-Policy Pairs have the
same policy, a common case, the intersection of the policies reduces
to a single instance of the policy. This new model Data-Policy Pair
can be distributed to another subset of participants. These steps
are repeated until sufficient accuracy is achieved and the model
is released to either the edge nodes for local use, or returned to
the third-party that made the request. Note, that if the model is
returned to the third-party service, the data are no longer under
any policy control.
3.4 Threat model
As demonstrated above, our system operates in the similar set-
ting assumed by the previous work on federated learning [11, 35]
where an algorithm is trained among multiple edge machines with-
out exchanging their data samples, but restrict our assumptions
about the global provider to enable access to federated learning
by third-parties. Our key distinction is that the provider that re-
quests training on the user’s data can provide different programs
and models but has to satisfy particular policies defined by the
participants on their data. Unlike the case of federated learning for
Google’s keyboard prediction [25], we consider the model where
the provider requesting a model does not own the infrastructure,
such as BBCBox [5] or OpenMined [40] which aims to open fed-
erated learning to external providers. In this work, we make the
following assumptions:
• Users trusts their local device (i.e., the Databox) for storing
their personal data in raw format.
• We only guard what is protected under the policy.
• Data can only be considered as trusted when a policy accom-
panies it.
• Once the policy-allowed transformed data leaves PoliFL, we
have no control over the data anymore and could be used
for any purpose.
• Policies are developed in good faith to protect access to
data and the system administrator will inspect and explicitly
authorize policies before they are used.
Based on these assumptions, we consider the following threat
model:
(1) An attacker can be “honest but curious”, meaning that in
case they acquire access to the Central Service, they will not
be able to manipulate the user policies.
(2) An attacker cannot access the user’s device.
(3) An attacker can submit application programs that attempt
to use more data or violate policies.
The last point is important in Federated Learning as we assume
that participants themselves can access and modify their devices.
It’s possible that malicious participants can compromise the overall
training by injecting backdoors, but this can be mitigated by using
differential privacy [36] at expense of losing some accuracy [4]. The
application can decide to utilize differential privacy to guarantee
both privacy of users’ contributions and safety from the backdoor
attack.
4 POLICY-BASED FEDERATED LEARNING
To evaluate our system, we pick a domain of training a machine
learning model on users’ data. We consider a centralized training
task at the Central Service that fetches data from the edge devices.
However, transferring sensitive data over the internet and storing
it in the Central Service adds additional privacy risks. As an alter-
native to central processing we try Federated Learning [30] that
attempts to build a single model by aggregating models obtained by
local training on users’ data. Besides traditional federated learning,
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Figure 2: Evaluation of different training strategies. Image classification (a) doesn’t suffer from using federated training,
whereas language modeling task (b) benefits from centralized training. Differential privacy impacts more the language model
than the image model.
as introduced by McMahan et al. [35], we consider adding differen-
tial privacy [17]. Recently proposed Differentially Private federated
learning [36] enhances learning underlying distribution with pri-
vacy guarantees. Furthermore, other aggregation techniques such
as median and trimmed mean aggregation [9, 14] promise better
defenses against privacy and security attacks [4, 6]. However, prior
work has not addressed the constraint that users’ might have differ-
ent preferences over their privacy and thus could allow or forbid
centralized training. In this section we investigate the combination
of multiple distributed training approaches where different partici-
pants have policies preferring one way over another. For instance,
we consider that some portion of the participants permit centralized
training, whereas other part only allows federated learning. We
show that a resulting model still converges to the appropriate solu-
tion even when there exist multiple different aggregation methods
and policies.
4.1 Training modes
We support three initial policies that users can assign to their data
on the edge device: (i) centralized training, (ii) federated learning, and
(iii) differentially private federated learning. These policies can be
extended to support various techniques, such as byzantine tolerant
federated learning [9].
Centralized training is the simplest non-federated case, where
the single model is trained on the Central Service after the data
is pulled from each participant. This setting assumes that the sen-
sitive data will leave the user’s device and travel to the Central
Service which could introduce additional privacy risks. Although,
this approach sends data over the network, it reduces computation
on participant’s device and offloads it to the cloud. Algorithm 1
shows a simple function that implements central training given
some model G0 and aggregated user dataset Dcentral .
Federated Averaging [35] randomly selects a subset ofm par-
ticipants Sm and sends them the current joint model Gt in each
round t . Choosingm involves a trade-off between the efficiency
and the speed of training. Each selected participant updates this
model to a new local model Lt+1 by training on their private data
and sends the difference Lt+1i −Gt back using Algorithm 2. Com-
munication overhead can be reduced by applying a randommask to
the model weights ([31]). The central server averages the received
updates to create the new joint model:
Gt+1 = Gt +
η
n
m∑
i=1
(Lt+1i −Gt ) (1)
We use Algorithm 2 for local training to produce the update
Lt+1i −Gt . Received models in a single round are accumulated in
a temporary storage to reduce memory consumption using Algo-
rithm 4. Once the updates are received, Algorithm 5 implements
averaging and creates the model Gt+1.
Differentially Private Federated Learning –Recentwork [36]
presented differentially private federated learning on a participant
level. Differential privacy establishes that the model with and with-
out the user’s contribution would produce similar results, thus
providing a user with privacy over participation. The implementa-
tion is an extension of Equation 1 where each participant’s update
is clipped to the norm S , e.g., multiplied by max(1, S| |Lt+1i −Gt | |2 ), to
bound the sensitivity of the updates. Additionally, Gaussian noise
N(0,σ ) is added to the weighted average of updates:
Gt+1 = Gt +
η
n
m∑
i=1
(Clip(Lt+1i −Gt , S) +N(0,σ ))
.
4.2 Policy Controls
Each approach above can be covered by the corresponding poli-
cies that enforces the certain type of training without restricting
the model architecture or training parameters. The Central Ser-
vice requires certain functions defined in collaboration with the
third-party service, e.g., training, data fetching and aggregation
(see Algorithms 1-5). Ancile supports scoping and thus we combine
multiple training methods under a single umbrella call train. We
further introduce a function get_data(data_type) that fetches
corresponding data from Databox deployed by the participant. Al-
though the Ancile framework allows to control parameters of the
executed functions, we omit function parameters for simplicity.
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Algorithm 1 Central training. T - number of training rounds, lr -
local learning rate
1: function train_central(model G0, data Dcentral )
2: for round t ← 1,T do
3: for batch b ∈ Dcentral do
4: Gt ← Gt − lr · ∇ℓ(Gt+1,b)
5: end for
6: end for
7: return GT
8: end function
Algorithm 2 Local training. E - number of local epochs
1: function train_local(model Gt , data Dlocal )
2: # Initialize local model L for time t+1
3: Lt+1 ← Gt
4: for epoch e ← 1,E do
5: for batch b ∈ Dlocal do
6: Lt+1 ← Lt+1 − lr · ∇ℓ(Lt+1,b)
7: end for
8: end for
9: return Lt+1
10: end function
Algorithm 3 Local training with Differential Privacy. S - clipping
bound, σ - amount of added noise
1: function train_local_dp(Gt , Dlocal ):
2: # Perform normal local training
3: Lt+1 ← train_local(model ,Dlocal )
4: return Clip(Lt+1, S) + N(0,σ 2)
5: end function
Algorithm 4 Collect received models after one round of training.
tmp_sum - stores received models and initialized with zeros.
1: function accumulate(model L, tmp_sum)
2: for name n, param p ∈ L.parameters() do
3: tmp_sum[n]+=p
4: end for
5: return tmp_sum
6: end function
Algorithm 5 Model update method. total_n - total number of
participants, η - global learning rate
1: function average(model , tmp_sum)
2: for name n, param p ∈model .parameters() do
3: update = η/total_n · (tmp_sum[n])
4: param.add_(update)
5: end for
6: returnmodel
7: end function
Corresponding policies and programs – We propose to use
the following policies to control the usage of the participant’s data:
get_data . train_local . accumulate∗
.(train . accumulate∗ + average)∗.return
This policy, first, ensures that user’s data is only used in local
training on the device. Second, it specifies that the result of local
training can be combinedwith othermodels and the resultingmodel
can participate in future iterations of the federated learning, before
being returned to the third-party provider. This policy permits
execution of the program in Algorithm 6.
By using iteration in the policy, we support multiple rounds of
training using the combination of policies. Function train_local
takes both the current model Gt with policy Pmodel and local
user data D with policy Pdata and produces a new model Lt+1
with the policy Pmodel&Pdata . Similarly, functions accumulate
and average combine two policy-controlled objects. We prevent
explosion of policy size by using simple reduction rules that keep
the policy size constant [3].
For the participants who prefer having differential privacy en-
abled we use method train_local_dp instead of train_local.
Furthermore, if the participants allow sharing data with the Cen-
tral Service they can adapt the simpler policy but use a filter
command to enforce removal of sensitive data.
get_data . filter . train_central∗ . return
As stated above, the third party can create their own model and
distribute it to the participants along with the code that should
satisfy the associated policies. The Central Service will fetch the
corresponding policies and execute that program. As we stated
above, policies are public, and the provider can design programs
that satisfy them.
4.3 Experimental Setup
Hardware We perform experiments on two different tasks to
demonstrate the feasibility of our approach. We focus on training
Federated Learning models for both image and text tasks, similar
to the original FL paper [35]. Each experiment is run sequentially
on 2 NVidia TitanX GPUs in order to speed up training and obtain
the convergence results. As code and library implementation is the
same, we expect the same results to hold when run on an edge
device. We provide performance evaluation of the edge device in
the following Section 5.
Language modeling – Typed text can include sensitive informa-
tion. Distributed training can help conceal the data by releasing
only trained models instead of raw text [25]. We use our system to
train a word prediction model using the Reddit dataset [35]. This
scenario is reasonable in the Databox setting, where the user might
want to train a predictive model not only based on mobile keyboard,
but also using activities at the personal computer or laptop.
We use 80, 000 posts from the public Reddit dataset considering
users that have between 150 and 500 posts with 247 posts each on
average. The task is to predict the next word given a partial word
sequence. Each post is treated as a training sentence. We use a two-
layer, 10M-parameter sample LSTM model [42] with 200 hidden
units. An input is split into a sequence of 64 words. For participants
local training, we use a batch size 20, learning rate of 20, and the
SGD optimizer. We run 5,500 rounds of training and picking 100
participants every round. For differential private training we follow
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parameters from [36] and set the clipping bound S = 15 and noise
σ = 0.01.
Image classification – A user might decide to store photos or
videos on the local device but still decide to contribute to the global
recognition model. We use CIFAR-10 image recognition [32] task
as another scenario of use for Federated Learning. We split the data
among 100 participants using Dirichlet distribution with α = 0.9.
We use ResNet18 model [27] with 1.2mln parameters, batch size 32,
and learning rate 0.1. We run 350 rounds of training selecting 10
participants each round. For differentially private federated learning
we similarly set S = 15 and σ = 0.01.
4.4 Convergence results
We want to check whether the combination of multiple different
modes of training is capable of improving the performance of the
model. We perform training of three models: centralized, federated,
and do a combination of two of them. We observe that the centrally
trained model is capable of achieving higher performance on the
Reddit dataset, but does not outperform the FL model on image
classification data.
We then perform training of the mixed model, where some par-
ticipants can have a policy permitting data release, and others only
allow federated training on their data. For the mixed model we
assign half of the users a federated policy and another half a cen-
tralized training policy. We implement it by sampling each round
of training from the group of users who are either locally trained or
centrally trained. Thus, we mix the rounds of central and federated
training.
Figure 2 demonstrates that the language task on the Reddit data
can greatly improve by using some participants who are willing
to train on their data centrally, thus achieving improvement over
the federated model. The Reddit dataset effect is profound, but it
does not outperform the FL model on image classification data.
We speculate that this could be caused by the fact that the Reddit
data is unique to each participant whereas CIFAR dataset is split
by randomly taking subparts of the dataset.
We ran training of a differentially private model and achieved ac-
curacy lower than non-differential approach. The effect of clipping
and noise as methods to restrict update contributions by a single
user could significantly diverge or slow down training and affect.
We do not combine the DP training to the centralized or federated
models, as this combination might break the privacy guarantees
of the final model. However, combination of protected and less-
protected data with meaningful guarantees could be a promising
direction.
We demonstrate that the policy-controlled machine learning can
converge for different modes of training and even in the mixed
scenario when participants have different policies preferring cen-
tralized and federated scenarios. Provided policies are compact and
control the programs submitted by the third-party allowing only
the trained model to be returned back.
5 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
In this section, we seek to answer the following questions:
• What is the internal overhead of the edge components of the
system?
Algorithm 6 Sample program sent to Central Service. users - list
of participant’s names and their addresses. RemoteCall - asynchro-
nous remote execution service.
1: function remote_prog(dpp, model)
2: data = get_data(dpp,model)
3: model = train_local(model , data)
4: returnmodel
5: end function
6: model = create_model()
7: rpc = RemoteCall()
8: for round r ∈ rounds do
9: users = sample(total , m)
10: for (user u, address addr )← users do
11: # create new DPP with user’s policy
12: dpp = get_dpp(u)
13: msд = pack(dpp, REMOTE_PROG,model)
14: # distribute the request
15: rpc .sendto(to = addr ,msд =msд)
16: end for
17: tmp_sum = rpc .join(callback = accumulate)
18: model = average(model , tmp_sum)
19: end for
20: returnmodel
Table 1: Device Specification
Type Specification
Model Intel NUC NUC7i3BNB
RAM 3GB DDR4 2,133 MHz
Swap 16 GB
Processor Intel Core i3-7100U (2-Cores, 2.4 GHz)
OS Ubuntu Server 64-bit 18.04.3 LTS
Linux 4.15.0-74
• What is the external overhead imposed by the platform in
terms of network traffic?
• To what extent can we scale our system, in terms of num-
ber of supported users and amount of data that could be
analyzed?
In order to answer these questions we conducted three evalua-
tions using the dataset from the language modeling task described
in Section 4. First, we evaluate the performance of training and
filtering on the edge device. Next, we measure round trip times for
Central Service requests executed on an edge device. In particular,
we measure the times shown in Figure 3. Time to Distribute (TTD)
is the time to send the policy program and Data-Policy Pair to
the edge device; Time to Execute (TTE) is the time to execute the
policy program on the edge device; Time to Receive (TTR) is the
time to transmit the updated Data-Policy Pair back to the Central
Service; and Time to Process (TPP) is the time to process the received
Data-Policy Pair on the Central Service. Finally, we evaluate the
scalability of the system by performing one round of training on
312 simulated edge devices and measuring TTD, TTR, and TTP for
all devices.
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Figure 3: PoliFL Evaluation: We consider measures for the
Time to Distribute (TTD), Time to Execute (TTE), Time to
Receive (TTR) and Time to Process (TTP).
5.1 System Configuration
Our evaluation experiments were run with several hardware and
software configurations described below. The edge-device overhead
evaluations were carried out using an Intel NUC, a small factor
mini PC with the specifications in Table 1 and running PoliFL on
Databox v0.5.2.
To evaluate network and system overheads, we install the Central
Service on an AWS instance with a Xeon E5-2686 8-core processor
running at 2.3 GHz with 64 GB of memory. For our scalability
evaluation, we run the Central Service on an Intel Core i7-4790
4-core processor running at 3.6 GHz with 64 GB of memory. This
server is located on a 1 Gigabit Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN)
with 52 edge devices, each of which has Intel Core i5-8500 6-core
processor with running at 3.0 GHz with 16 GB of memory. Each of
the 52 machines have the same software configuration as the Intel
NUC used in the previous experiments.
The Central Service of PoliFL runs on Ubuntu Server v18.04.3
using Ancile v0.3 and communicates with the edge devices using
the RabbitMQ7 message broker v3.8.2.
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Figure 4: Density histogram of all filtered words (i.e., words
with valence ranking > 5.0) per user.
5.2 Edge-Device Overheads
This section reports the performance of an edge device conducting
the two Ancile policy enforcement operations: (i) a text filtering
policy in a centralized training context, and (ii) training two Deep
7https://www.rabbitmq.com
Neural Networks (DNNs) of different sizes, in a federating learning
context, as previously discussed in Section 4. Specifically, we report
the Time to Execute (TTE), as the time this operation takes to execute,
together with the CPU utilization and memory overhead of the edge
device. We run the referenced task on the Intel NUC for 1, 000 users
in the dataset, simulating how an edge device with different user
data would execute these operations.
For the text filtering task, we applied a policy that identified in
text those words with high valence (valence ranking > 5.0; N =
1, 459 words) and filtered them out. We used the Affective Norms
for English Words (ANEW) dataset [12] as our word reference
dictionary. Figure 4 reports the filtered words per user in the Reddit
dataset, demonstrating the weight of the text filtering task, with a
mean of 2.17k word removals per user (±1.74k).
For the DNN task, we used the language modelling task described
in Section 4 for the two models of different sizes: (i) 1 layer LSTM
with 20-dimensional embedding vectors (small DNN), and (ii) 2
layers with 200-dimensional (large DNN). We ran a single round of
Federated Learning [35] training with 1, 000 participants per round,
each performing 100 local epochs before submitting model weights
to the Central Service.
Figure 5 summarizes the edge device performance for these tasks.
As expected, text filtering was the least expensive for the edge de-
vice, with mean TTE 0.08s (±0.07), CPU utilization 9.02% (±7.91)
and almost no memory overhead. The DNN training task of the
small model reported a mean TTE of 31.79s (±26.55), CPU uti-
lization 61.94% (±14.51) and a memory overhead 3.51% (±4.05).
Finally, the larger DNN training task was the most resource de-
manding of all, with a mean TTE of 72.80s (±63.85), CPU utilization
50.02% (±18.41) and memory overhead 2.65% (±2.93). The results
show that a small factor mini PC like the Intel NUC could be used
as an edge device in our system, even with more demanding task
such as training a DNN model, with reasonable execution times
and resource overheads. While not tested in this work, we expect
that cheaper devices that have similar device specifications, such
as the new Raspberry Pi 48, could also be used in the same context.
5.3 Network and System Overheads
Having evaluated the performance of local execution on the edge
device, we now look at the performance of the Central Service by
evaluating networking and processing overheads on the Central
Service. We evaluate the system-wide performance for the three
tasks (text filtering, small DNN training, and large DNN training)
with the Central Service hosted on an AWS instance communicating
to a single edge device. As we previously measured TTE, these
experiments only measure TTD, TTR, and TTP.
For text filtering, we performed 100 rounds of filtering on the
edge device, which sends the filtered text back to the Central Service.
The results are shown in Figure 6a. The TTD, 0.37s (±0.0), for
this task is low, as only the policy program is distributed. The
TTR, 3.11s (±0.03), for this task takes a little longer. Although the
filtered text is not very large (46kb), there is a small amount of fixed
overhead in creating the data connection from the edge device back
to the Central Service. The TTP was measured in section 4.3 and
was 0.2s (±0.01), which is a negligible part of the total task.
8https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-4-model-b/
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Figure 5: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) representation of the performance metrics (duration, CPU utilization and
memory overhead) for the following use cases: (i) text filtering (first row), (ii) Small DNN training task (second row) and (iii)
Large DNN training task (third row).
For the DNN training tasks, we evaluated the round-trip perfor-
mance for 100 rounds of training on an edge device. We did two
experiments, one with a small DNN (12 MB) model and one with a
large DNN (120 MB) model. Figures 6b and 6c show the range of
times for one round of training for these models.
For both the small and large DNN, it took longer to receive the
model than to distribute it. There are two reasons for this. The first
is the model sent from Central Service to the edge device is smaller
than the one that is returned back to the Central Service due to
PyTorch’s implementation of running statistics. In our experiments,
the small DNNmodel sent to the edge device was 8MB in size, while
the model returned to the Central Service was 12 MB. Similarly,
the large DNN model sent to the edge device was 80 MB, while
the model returned to the Central Service was 120 MB, 50% larger.
The other reason is that the networking bandwidth to the AWS
server was asymmetrical. The bandwidth for sending data to the
edge device was measured at 17.5 MB/s, while the bandwidth from
the edge device to the Central Service was only 10.2 MB/s, so it is
not surprising the TTR times were larger than TTD times.
For both experiments, the overhead to send and receive the
model is reasonable, relative to the time to compute the model. For
the small DNN model, the mean time to distribute the model (TTD)
was 2.57s (±0.18), and the mean time to receive the model (TTE)
was 6.03s (±0.05), compared to the mean TTE of 31.8s (±26.55).
Results for the large DNN model are similar. The mean TTD was
6.9s (±1.74) and the mean TTR 17.35s (±1.98), compared to the
mean TTE of 72.8s (±63.85).
The last measurement, TTP, is the time to accumulate and aver-
age the model once it is received at the Central Service. This time
is negligible, averaging 0.29s (±0.01) for the small DNN model, and
0.7s (±0.01) for the large DNN model.
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For the DDN training tasks, the majority of the time is spent
doing computation on the edge device and distributing and receiv-
ing the models. The time to transfer the models is dependent on
the available bandwidth and is unavoidable when using federated
learning.
5.4 Scaling
For our last evaluation, wemeasure the Central Service performance
on the language modeling task with multiple edge devices. We
demonstrate the scalability of our system by performing one round
of training with 312 participants. This number was chosen as we
had access to 52 machines, each with a six-core processors, allowing
us to run six instances of Databox and Ancile, one on each core, and
giving us a total of six edge devices per machine. These machines
were all on the same 1 Gigabit Ethernet Local Area Network (LAN)
along with a server running the Central Service.
The Central Service distributed the initial model to all 312 devices
simultaneously. To match the performance of the edge device, we
took TTE times from the Section 5.2 (Figure 5), and sent back a
model after waiting. We ran the experiment for both the small and
large DNN tasks and the results are shown in Figure 7.
This figure shows the total time to process each device request,
shown in the order of arrival at the Central Service. The total time
for each request is shown, broken down as TTD, TTE, and TTR. TTP
was measured (0.29s (±0.01) for the small DMM and 0.7s (±0.02)
for the large DMM) but is not shown as it is negligible compared
to the other times.
For both tasks, the majority of the overhead is the time it takes
to distribute the model (TTD) to all 312 devices. The network is
at capacity and many nodes have to wait awhile before they can
start running the policy program. In the case of the small DNN task,
the models are small enough that there was not much of a delay in
sending the models back. In the large DNN task, the network is not
able to keep up with receiving models as well, adding extra delay.
However, in both cases, there are outlier devices with a relatively
long TTE. This is especially noticeable in the small DNN task. As
the total time to complete a round of training is dependent on the
slowest policy program execution time, the overall time to complete
a round of training is not much longer than the TTE of the slowest
device. This shows that the longer the local computation on the
device, the less important the networking overheads become at
scale.
6 RELATEDWORK
Personal Information Management Systems. Also known as
personal data banks, PIMS are generalized solutions that help indi-
viduals manage their personal data in secure, usually local storage
systems and control the data sharing process. While this work was
based on the Databox [13] platform, other similar open-source sys-
tems exist such as the OpenPDS [15]. At this moment, none of these
platforms have the ability to control data sharing with third-parties
using use-based privacy policies. Instead, they are used as platforms
for securing the data, where third-party apps can be installed that
can process the data locally.
Examples of these approaches are appearing in the consumer
domain. For instance, BBC Box [5], an upcoming digital media hub
from the BBC will allow users to enjoy personalized recommender
services without sharing personal data. The BBC Box recommender
system aggregates the user data from a range of media services and
processes it at the device to create a user profile, without sharing
data to a centralized cloud service.
Privacy Preserving Machine Learning. One of the first tech-
niques that was used for protecting the user’s privacywhile running
joint computation is Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [22],
a cryptographic technique that allows mutually distrusting parties
to run joint computations without revealing private data. One of
the main limitations of such technique is that it performs badly
with large datasets, even with only a few parties getting involved.
Volgushev et al. [49] recently presented a scalable solution, based on
MPC, that is applicable to large datasets, using query rewriting to
minimize expensive processing under MPC. Other approaches for
secure computations exist, such as Opaque [53], where they use a
Trust Execution Environment (TEE) to run most of the computation
under a secure environment.
More focused on themachine learning context, Servia-Rodriguez et
al. [45] presented an approach of downloading a shared model
trained with a small number of users and personalize it at the
edge device for protecting the user’s privacy. Federated Learn-
ing [30, 31, 35], aim to keep users’ data on their devices while con-
tributing into a global model without sharing the data. Federated
learning assumes only a single consumer that runs training on the
user’s data. To further protect user data recent solutions extend fed-
erated learning with differential privacy [36] or encryption [11, 26].
These approaches are relevant to our work, however the privacy
policies cannot be dynamically negotiated and are uniform across
users. Instead, we investigate a policy-controlled execution of feder-
ated learning, where each user has a personal policy that specifies
how to handle their data depending on the application specifics.
Privacy in Ubiquitous Systems. User’s passively generated data
could reveal sensitive details such as behavioral patterns [24, 28]
and physical presence [51] can lead to stalking or disparate treat-
ment [24, 52]. PrivacyStreams [34] focuses on controlling Android
applications. However, it lacks a policy enforcement component
and does not support FL. The TaintDroid [18] and FlowDroid [2]
project do not enforce policy restrictions, similar to other works
[33, 37, 41, 50].
Policy-based Privacy. Language-level information flow control
techniques [44] is a popular approach on tracking data propagation
through the system. The recently proposed Ancile framework [3]
combines this concept with use-based privacy [8] that introduces
policies that “react” to data transformation. However, that frame-
work is limited to centralized data processing and does not extend
to federated setting.
Recent work [20], proposed data flow authentication control
using homomorphic encryption and SGX enclaves that prevents an
adversary from modifying the program. However, this approach
requires a fixed program to be authorized, whereas our framework
supports flexible programs that satisfy the corresponding policies.
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Figure 6: Time to Distribute (TTD), Time to Receive (TTR) and Time to Process (TTP) for the three tasks on a single Databox.
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Figure 7: Time to Distribute (TTD), Time to Execute (TTE), and Time to Receive (TTR) for a small and a large DNN model for
one round of training with 312 simultaneous users. The time to process the request is dominated by the time it takes to send
the DNN model to all the edge devices (TTD) and a small number of edge devices that require a longer time to execute. The
Time to Process (TTP) on the Central Service is negligible relative to the other times and is not shown here.
7 CONCLUSIONS
We presented PoliFL, a decentralised policy-based framework for
personalized and private data analytics. Using a number of privacy-
sensitive use cases including image and text-based models, we
evaluated PoliFL based on Federated Learning as an exemplar ap-
plication scenario and demonstrated its feasibility and scalability.
One limitation of our system is that the overall performance de-
pends on the network bandwidth. In future work wewill investigate
techniques such as DNN model compression or use of alternative
queuing system to help PoliFL scale better.
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